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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellant Barton & Pittinos, Inc. ("B&P") is a 
pharmaceutical marketing company. B&P entered into a 
contract with appellee SmithKline Beecham Corp. ("SKB") to 
market SKB's Engerix-B vaccine for hepatitis-B ("the 
vaccine") to nursing homes. Under the terms of the 
program, B&P would provide the nursing homes with 
information about the vaccine and would solicit orders. 
B&P would then pass the orders to General Injectables and 
Vaccines, Inc. ("GIV"), which would buy the vaccine from 
SKB and then resell it to the nursing homes, with B&P 
receiving a commission. When SKB, B&P, and GIV 
launched this program, SKB, it is alleged, was inundated 
with a flood of complaints from the consultant pharmacists 
who had traditionally supplied the nursing homes with 
SKB's vaccines and other pharmaceutical products. 
Assertedly bowing to pressure from the pharmacists, SKB 
terminated the program. 
 
B&P brought this action against SKB, alleging that SKB 
conspired with the pharmacists to restrain competition in 
the nursing home market for the vaccine, in violation of § 1 
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. B&P also asserted 
claims under state law for breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment. The district court granted summary judgment 
in favor of SKB on B&P's antitrust claim on the ground that 
B&P lacked standing to sue for its alleged injuries under 
the antitrust laws. B&P appealed. We hold that the injury 
alleged by B&P is not the type of injury that the antitrust 
laws were intended to prevent because B&P was not a 
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competitor or a consumer in the market in which trade was 
allegedly restrained. Since B&P therefore cannot 
demonstrate "antitrust injury," it lacks standing under the 




In 1991, B&P learned that the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration would soon require employers whose 
employees might be exposed to blood-borne pathogens to 
educate their employees about the vaccine against 
hepatitis-B and to make the vaccine available to them free 
of charge. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (1991). At the time, 
the only manufacturers of the vaccine were SKB and Merck 
& Co. Sensing an opportunity to profit from this regulatory 
mandate, B&P developed a plan to market the vaccine to 
nursing homes. SKB agreed to pay B&P a flat fee in 
exchange for B&P's preparation and distribution to the 
nursing homes of educational materials regarding the 
vaccine and the regulations. B&P performed the agreed- 
upon work and SKB compensated it according to the 
contract. The next step in the program was for B&P to 
telephone the nursing homes (under the trade name "The 
Medical Phone Company") to solicit orders for the vaccine. 
B&P contends that SKB agreed to pay it a commission of 
7% on sales of the vaccine as compensation for these 
telemarketing services.1 
 
Because B&P, as a marketing company rather than a 
pharmaceutical company, lacked the required license to 
buy, possess, or sell the vaccine, the program did not call 
for B&P actually to distribute the vaccine to the nursing 
homes. Rather, B&P's function was to drum up demand for 
the vaccine, solicit orders from the nursing homes, and 
pass the orders along to GIV, a licensed medical supply 
house. GIV would fill the orders by purchasing the vaccine 
from SKB and would then resell the vaccine to the nursing 
homes. 
 
The program debuted in January 1992. Before the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In accordance with the law governing summary judgment, in our 
recitation of the facts we accept B&P's evidence as true. 
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commencement of this program, the nursing homes had 
traditionally obtained their vaccines and other 
pharmaceutical products from "consultant pharmacists." A 
nursing home's consultant pharmacist would educate 
nursing home administrators and staff about 
pharmaceutical products and regulatory requirements; 
assist the nursing home in storing its pharmaceuticals and 
in keeping the required records relating to their 
prescription; negotiate directly with pharmaceutical 
manufacturers regarding price and other terms of purchase 
of pharmaceutical products; and take orders from the 
nursing home, purchase the desired products from the 
manufacturers, and resell them to the nursing home. 
Because the SKB/B&P/GIV program promised economically 
advantageous terms to the nursing homes, the nursing 
homes accorded the program a favorable reception. 
 
The nursing homes' gain, however, was the pharmacists' 
loss. Almost immediately, many individual pharmacists as 
well as pharmacist trade associations complained to SKB 
that the program bypassed and undercut them on price, 
and some threatened to boycott SKB products if SKB 
continued the program.2 In March 1992, following meetings 
with pharmacist groups, SKB discontinued the program. 
SKB terminated the telemarketing and distribution program 
involving B&P and GIV and reverted to its prior practice of 
distributing the vaccine through consultant pharmacists. 
Even after SKB ended the program, it continued to explore 
the possibility of continuing to employ B&P to help to 





B&P filed this action in October 1995. Under § 4 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, B&P claimed that it was 
entitled to treble damages for SKB's conspiracy with the 
pharmacists to restrain trade in the market for sales of the 
vaccine to nursing homes, in violation of § 1 of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Some state regulatory bodies, apparently at the instigation of 
pharmacist groups, also expressed concern to SKB and GIV about the 
program, but it does not appear that any official action was taken. 
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Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. B&P also pled claims under 
state law, alleging that SKB had breached its contract with 
B&P by terminating the telemarketing program and 
refusing to pay B&P any commission and, in the 
alternative, that SKB had been unjustly enriched by the 
receipt of B&P's telemarketing services. 
 
In August 1996, SKB moved for summary judgment, 
contending that B&P lacked antitrust standing because it 
was neither a competitor nor a consumer in the market in 
which trade was allegedly restrained. The district court held 
that B&P had failed to show that its alleged injury 
constituted "antitrust injury" and granted the motion. 
Barton & Pittinos, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 942 F. 
Supp. 235, 237 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The court also held that 
the existence of more direct victims than B&P and the 
danger of complex apportionment of damages among those 
injured by the alleged conspiracy weighed againstfinding 
that B&P had antitrust standing. Id. at 237-38. With B&P's 
lone federal claim dismissed, the court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and 
dismissed them without prejudice. Id. at 238. 
 
In this appeal, B&P argues that the district court erred in 
finding as a matter of law that it did not compete with the 
pharmacists. B&P submits that the record contains 
evidence from SKB, Merck, and the pharmacists themselves 
showing that they all believed that B&P competed with the 
pharmacists. We exercise plenary review over the district 
court's grant of summary judgment. McCarthy v. Recordex 
Services, Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 847 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 
S.Ct. 86 (1996).3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In our review, we "apply the same test the district court should have 
used initially." In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 433 n.10 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 56 (1996). Summary judgment should be 
granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). On a 
summary judgment motion the court must construe the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party and give that party the 
benefit of all reasonable inferences. See In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 433 
n.10. 
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III. 
 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, provides 
that "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust 
laws" may maintain a private action for treble damages. 
Despite this broad statutory language, however, the 
Supreme Court has held that the common-law background 
of the antitrust laws requires a narrower, less literal 
reading. See Associated General Contractors of California, 
Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 
529-33 (1983) ("AGC"). In developing the concept of 
antitrust standing, the Court "focus[ed] on the nature of the 
plaintiff's alleged injury," asking "whether it is of the type 
that the antitrust statute was intended to forestall." Id. at 
538-39. If the injury is not of the requisite type, even 
though the would-be plaintiff may have suffered an injury 
as a result of conduct that violated the antitrust laws, he or 
she has no standing to bring a private action under the 
antitrust laws to recover for it. In AGC, the Court held that 
because the plaintiff was "neither a consumer nor a 
competitor in the market in which trade was restrained," its 
injury was not the type of injury that the antitrust laws 
were designed to prevent. Id. at 539. Therefore, the plaintiff 
might be able to sue under a different statute or common- 
law rule, and a different plaintiff might be able to sue under 
the antitrust laws, but the plaintiff had no standing to sue 
under the antitrust laws. See also Brunswick Corp. v. 
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
 
The Supreme Court in AGC also discussed other factors 
that must be balanced in order to determine whether a 
plaintiff is a proper party to bring an antitrust claim. See 
459 U.S. at 540-44. We have synthesized the Court's 
analysis into the following formulation of the factors that 
are relevant in an antitrust standing challenge: 
 
(1) the causal connection between the antitrust 
violation and the harm to the plaintiff and the intent by 
the defendant to cause that harm, with neither factor 
alone conferring standing; (2) whether the plaintiff's 
alleged injury is of the type for which the antitrust laws 
were intended to provide redress; (3) the directness of 
the injury, which addresses the concerns that liberal 
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application of standing principles might produce 
speculative claims; (4) the existence of more direct 
victims of the alleged antitrust violations; and (5) the 
potential for duplicative recovery or complex 
apportionment of damages. 
 
In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 
1144, 1165-66 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Lake Erie"). 
 
The district court in this case relied principally on the 
second factor that we identified in Lake Erie. On the basis 
of its conclusion that B&P was not a competitor or a 
consumer in the market allegedly restrained, the court held 
that B&P's injury was not of a type that the antitrust laws 
were designed to prevent. See Schuylkill Energy Resources, 
Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 415 
(3d Cir. 1997) ("A plaintiff who is neither a competitor nor 
a consumer in the relevant market does not suffer antitrust 
injury") (quoting Vinci v. Waste Management, Inc., 80 F.3d 
1372, 1376 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 
Antitrust injury is a necessary but insufficient condition 
of antitrust standing. Lake Erie, 998 F.2d at 1166 
("antitrust injury is more than a component to be factored 
in a standing analysis, it must be present in every case") 
(citation omitted). Even a plaintiff who can show antitrust 
injury may lack antitrust standing, because the remaining 
AGC factors may weigh against allowing him or her to sue 
under the antitrust laws. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, 
Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 n.5 (1986) ("A showing of antitrust 
injury is necessary, but not always sufficient, to establish 
standing under § 4, because a party may have suffered 
antitrust injury but may not be a proper party under § 4 for 
other reasons").4 
 
A. We thus turn to the question whether B&P adduced 
sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable factfinder to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The antitrust injury requirement in the context of antitrust standing 
can thus be seen as analogous to the constitutional minimum required 
for standing to sue in federal court in general, and the other AGC factors 
may be thought of as prudential limits on standing that are particularly 
necessary or appropriate in the antitrust context. Cf. Florida Seed Co., 
Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 105 F.3d 1372, 1374 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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conclude that it competed in the market in which trade was 
allegedly restrained, such that its alleged injury would 
constitute "antitrust injury."5 The answer to this question 
depends on how that market is defined. B&P's complaint 
defined the relevant market as "all hepatitis-B vaccine sold 
to nursing homes" in the United States. (App. 25) 
(emphasis added). It alleged that the unlawful conspiracy 
aimed "to eliminate B&P as a competitor in the distribution 
of hepatitis B vaccine to nursing homes . . . ." (App. 25) 
(emphasis added). Because it is undisputed that B&P never 
"sold" or "distributed" or sought to sell or distribute any 
vaccine to anyone, however, it is plain that B&P was not a 
competitor in the market for sales of the vaccine. 
 
In its briefs and at oral argument, B&P espoused a 
slightly different view of the relevant market and its role 
therein. B&P argues that the evidence demonstrates that 
"Barton & Pittinos and its program competed with and 
displaced the pharmacists." Appellant's Br. at 15. In our 
view, the key words in this quoted statement are "and its 
program." B&P is surely correct in its assertion that the 
program whereby B&P marketed the vaccine and GIV filled 
the orders solicited by B&P competed with the pharmacists. 
The SKB/GIV/B&P program, taken as a whole, offered a 
package of marketing and distribution of the vaccine -- a 
package that was equivalent to the package offered by the 
consultant pharmacists. We agree with B&P that the 
pharmacists' efforts to kill the SKB/GIV/B&P program 
show that they viewed it as competition. And we agree with 
B&P that the nursing homes' eagerness to abandon the 
pharmacists in favor of the SKB/GIV/B&P program shows 
that the package of goods and services offered by the 
SKB/GIV/B&P program was reasonably interchangeable 
with the package of goods and services offered by the 
pharmacists. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) ("The outer boundaries of a 
product market are determined by the reasonable 
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand 
between the product itself and substitutes for it."). 
 
But the question presented in this appeal is whether B&P 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. B&P does not contend that it was a consumer in the relevant market. 
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was in competition with the pharmacists, not whether "the 
program" was. In order to hold that B&P was in competition 
with the pharmacists, we would have to conclude that what 
B&P offered was reasonably interchangeable with what the 
pharmacists offered. We agree with the district court that 
the record cannot support such a determination. B&P's role 
in the program was limited to marketing the vaccine; 
without GIV, there was no vaccine, only information about 
it. Thus, the nursing homes (the consumers in the relevant 
market here) were able to abandon the pharmacists in favor 
of the SKB/GIV/B&P program, but they could not have 
abandoned the pharmacists in favor of B&P alone. Doing so 
would have left the pharmacists without the most 
important part of the package of goods and services offered 
by SKB, GIV, and B&P together: the vaccine itself. 
Consequently, there was no cross-elasticity of demand as 
between the pharmacists' offerings and B&P's offerings; no 
matter how much the pharmacists raised the price of the 
package of the goods and services that they offered, the 
nursing homes could not have switched to B&P.6 
 
B. Perhaps anticipating the above analysis, B&P 
contends that "the fact that Barton & Pittinos worked with 
GIV to provide some elements of the competing package 
does not mean that Barton & Pittinos was not a competitor 
of the consultant pharmacists." Appellant's Br. at 23 
(emphasis added). We accept the basic premise of B&P's 
argument, which is that market definition is not determined 
by formal labels, but rather takes into account "the realities 
of competition." Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 826 (3d 
Cir. 1984). And we acknowledge that in defining markets 
some courts "have recognized that a product should not be 
excluded from a market because it requires an additional 
input in order to be a reasonable substitute for other 
products in the market." Bhan v. NME Hosp., Inc., 772 F.2d 
1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). But we reject 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. B&P attempts to mask this defect in its argument by referring to the 
program as the "Barton & Pittinos program" rather than the 
SKB/GIV/B&P program. It thus asserts that "Barton & Pittinos offered 
a better package at a lower price than the consultant pharmacists." 
Appellant's Br. at 22. As explained in the text, this assertion is simply 
untrue. 
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B&P's argument, because "the realities of competition" in 
this case are that the nursing homes could not have 
switched from the pharmacists to B&P alone and because 
we do not believe that the product itself can fairly be 
described as merely "an additional input." 
 
The cases upon which B&P relies are readily 
distinguishable. In Telex Corp. v. Int'l Business Mach. Corp., 
510 F.2d 894, 914-19 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 
802 (1975), the court held that Telex's and IBM's computer 
products were in the same market even though they were 
incompatible, because the "interchange of these products" 
was "easy and practicable." Similarly, in Bhan, the court 
held that nurse anesthetists and M.D. anesthesiologists 
competed in the same market even though nurse 
anesthetists required the "input" of "the supervision of an 
attending physician," because "such supervision is not only 
easily obtainable but is actually a common practice in the 
medical profession." 772 F.2d at 1471. In contrast, in this 
case it is clear that the "additional input" required by B&P 
-- if the vaccine itself can be so characterized -- was not 
"easily obtainable" or "practicable." Indeed, B&P was legally 
barred from buying, possessing, or selling the vaccine 
because it lacked the required prescription-drug license. Cf. 
Schuylkill, 113 F.3d at 415-16 (plaintiff could not show 
antitrust injury where it was prohibited by law from 
competing in the relevant market). 
 
B&P relies most heavily on Yellow Pages Cost 
Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 951 F.2d 1158 
(9th Cir. 1991). In that case, GTE, the defendant, published 
telephone directories and sold advertisements in them. 
Advertisers had a choice between purchasing 
advertisements and advertising consulting services as a 
package offered at one price by GTE or purchasing 
advertising consulting services from the plaintiffs, 
independent companies that placed ads with GTE. When 
GTE ended its practice of allowing independent companies 
to place ads, the plaintiffs remained free to sell advertising 
consulting services, but their business suffered because 
advertisers found it inconvenient to deal with the plaintiffs 
once they could no longer place the ads as well. The Ninth 
Circuit held that the plaintiffs had standing because they 
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competed with GTE in the market for yellow-pages 
advertising consulting services. Id. at 1161-62. 
 
Yellow Pages might help B&P if the court had held that 
the plaintiffs competed with GTE in the market for sales of 
yellow-pages advertising despite the fact that the plaintiffs 
did not actually sell yellow-pages ads, but rather merely 
information about yellow-pages ads. If such were the case, 
the analogy to the instant case would be good: B&P, like 
the Yellow Pages plaintiffs, offered marketing and 
educational services concerning a product, but did not offer 
the actual product itself. But this is not what the Yellow 
Pages court held. The Ninth Circuit has reiterated in 
subsequent cases that its holding in Yellow Pages was that 
"the plaintiffs and defendants did compete in the same 
market: the market for advising yellow page advertisers as 
to the form, content, and cost of yellow page advertising." 
Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1510 (9th Cir. 1997). 
Accord American Ad Management, Inc. v. GTE Corp., 92 
F.3d 781, 786 n.7 (9th Cir. 1996). Yellow Pages thus does 
not provide a basis for holding that by marketing the 
vaccine B&P competed in the market for the package of 
marketing and distribution of the vaccine.7 
 
B&P has not pointed us to, and we have been unable to 
locate, any case holding that an advertiser or broker has 
standing to sue for antitrust violations restraining trade in 
the market for sales of the good or service advertised or 
brokered. On the contrary, courts have held that 
advertisers and brokers of a good or service are not 
competitors of companies that actually supply the good or 
service. See, e.g., Bodie-Rickett and Assoc. v. Mars, Inc., 957 
F.2d 287, 290-91 (6th Cir. 1992); S.D. Collectibles, Inc. v. 
Plough, Inc., 952 F.2d 211, 213 (8th Cir. 1992).8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. B&P does not contend that a distinct market exists exclusively for the 
marketing of the vaccine. 
 
8. The district court, in reaching the same conclusion as we have, relied 
on evidence such as the deposition of B&P's president James Pittinos, in 
which Pittinos described B&P as an advertising and marketing agency 
which did not compete with wholesalers and pharmacists. See 942 F. 
Supp. at 237. 
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We therefore conclude that B&P did not compete with the 
pharmacists in the market for the package of marketing 
and distribution of the vaccine. Because B&P was thus not 
a competitor or a consumer in the market in which trade 
was allegedly restrained by the antitrust violations pled by 
B&P, we hold that B&P's alleged injury is not "antitrust 
injury," meaning injury "of the type that the antitrust 
statute was intended to forestall." AGC, 459 U.S. at 539. 
Accordingly, we agree with the district court's 
determination that B&P lacked standing to institute this 




For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
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9. Because B&P fails the antitrust injury requirement, it would lack 
standing even if the other AGC/Lake Erie factors favored it. We therefore 
need not address the district court's findings that there were more direct 
victims of the alleged conspiracy than B&P and that B&P's claims 
presented a danger of complex apportionment of damages. See 942 F. 
Supp. at 238. In light of our affirmance of the grant of summary 
judgment to SKB on B&P's antitrust claim, we affirm as well the district 
court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over B&P's 
state law claims. B&P may properly pursue its contractual claims 
against SKB in state court. 
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